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THE RIGHT OF A RECORDING COMPANY TO
ENJOIN AN ARTIST FROM RECORDING
FOR OTHERS
by Jay L. Cooper*
I. BACKGROUND
California Civil Code Section 3423 (Fifth)' provides that in order
for an employer to obtain an injunction against an employee to prevent
the breach of a contract for the rendition or furnishing of personal serv-
ices, the contract must be in writing and must be one "where the mini-
mum compensation for such services is at the rate of not less than
$6,000 per annum and where the promised service is of a special,
unique, unusual, extraordinary or intellectual character ... "'
Although the code section was enacted in 1919, there was no au-
thoritative case law interpreting it until the 1966 decision of Foxx v.
Williams.' In that case, comedian Redd Foxx brought an action
against the recording company that was distributing his comedy al-
bums for a declaration of rights, an accounting, and other relief. The
recording company cross-complained, seeking, among other remedies,
injunctive relief to prevent Foxx from making sound recordings for any
other party and from using his name and likeness in connection with
sound recordings made by any other party. After a court trial, Foxx
was enjoined and appealed from the judgment.' The Court of Appeal
vacated the injunction, holding that the statutory requirement of Civil
Code Section 3423 had not been met because Foxx's only compensa-
tion under the recording contract was in the form of royalties which
were contingent upon sales of his records. Therefore, the contract did
not guarantee Foxx receipt of any money as a result of his perform-
ance.5 Noting that the decision was not based on the absence of proof
of the amount of royalties actually earned pursuant to the contract, the
court explained its holding as follows:
An injunction which forbids an artist to accept new em-
* Partner, Cooper, Epstein & Hurewitz, Beverly Hills.
1. Cal. Civ. Code § 3423 (Fifth) (West 1970).
2. Id.
3. Foxx v. Williams, 244 Cal. App. 2d 223 (1966).
4. Id. at 227.
5. Id. at 236.
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ployment may be a harsh and powerful remedy. The mone-
tary limitation in the statute is intended to serve as a
counterweight in balancing the equities. The Legislature has
concluded that an artist who is not entitled to receive a mini-
mum of $6,000 per year by performing his contract should not
be subjected to this kind of economic coercion. Under the
statutory scheme, an artist who is enjoined from accepting
new employment will at least have the alternative of earning
$6,000 or more per year by performing his old contract.
Foxx is significant as the first and only appellate court decision on
the effect of Civil Code Section 3423 as it applied to the entertainment
industry. A series of cases preceded Foxx involving this issue as ap-
plied to the recording industry in particular, but none besides Foxx
reached the Court of Appeal. As a result of the Foxx decision, the
$6,000 minimum compensation requirement has become an important
issue in the recording industry. This article will focus on two recent
decisions: Discreet Records, Inc. v. Dalton,' which illustrates the re-
cording companies' response to the Foxx decision; and MCA Records,
Inc. v. Newton John,8 which indicates how many artists have used the
statute to their advantage.
II. DISCREET RECORDS, INC. v DALTON 9 AND THE $6,000 OPTION
Many record companies in California have attempted to circum-
vent the effect of Foxx v. Williams by inserting a provision in their
contracts granting the record company an option to pay the artist com-
pensation for services at a rate not less than $6,000 per year. Such
clauses read essentially as follows:
Company shall have the right and option, by giving writ-
ten notice to you at any time during each year of the term
hereof (as the same may be extended) to elect to revise this
Agreement so that during the then current period, and/or all
subsequent periods for which this Agreement may be renewed
or extended, Company shall guarantee payments to you as an
advance against royalties an amount equal to not less than
$6,000. In the event Company elects to revise this Agreement
in accordance with the above, Company shall pay to you
prior to the end of the then current period and/or all subse-
6. Id.
7. Discreet Records, Inc. v. Dalton, LA Sup. Ct. No. 122 536 (1976).
8. MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John, 90 Cal. App. 3d 18 (1979).
9. Supra note 7.
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quent periods the difference between the royalties and ad-
vances received by you pursuant to the provisions of this
Agreement (other than this paragraph) and $6,000 or an
amount equal to that portion of $6,000 that the number of
days remaining in the subject period bears to 365.
Such options were thought to put the record company in a position of
the least possible financial risk in the event the recording artist decided
to record for another company. If the artist had not earned enough
money for the record company, the company would not exercise the
option; but if the artist had earned enough, the company would.
The provision raised several questions left unanswered by Foxx.
Was it necessary to compensate the employee $6,000 per year from the
inception of the contract, or was it sufficient that the sum was guaran-
teed before the injunction was sought, even if such guarantee was made
subsequent to the alleged breach? The court in Foxx suggested that the
decision was reached as a matter of public policy; thus, the bootstrap-
ping effect of the option provision would appear to be contrary to the
legislative intent of the statute. Furthermore, what if the election to
guarantee the required amount was not made until some point after the
expiration of the initial year of the term? Does the public policy nature
of the statute require that the $6,000 be guaranteed in every year of the
contract period, or does the remedial nature of the statute indicate that
judicial inquiry will extend only to the year in which the alleged breach
was made? Since this option provision can be exercised at any time the
record company elects, may the record company elect to exercise the
option on the last day of the term, thereby paying the artist 1/365th of
$6,000, and still be entitled to injunctive relief?
In the case of Discreet Records, Inc. v. Dalton,"° a singer profes-
sionally known as Kathy Dalton entered into an exclusive recording
agreement with Discreet Records in 1973. The agreement provided
that Ms. Dalton would receive a $5,000 advance against royalties at the
time of execution of the contract, as well as any compensation required
by any applicable collective bargaining agreements. The contract also
purported to give the record company an option substantially similar to
the one referred to above.
A dispute arose between the parties regarding the musical compo-
sitions to be included on the second album to be produced under the
agreement, as a result of which, on May 9, 1974, Discreet suspended
the agreement, alleging failure of performance. Ms. Dalton denied the
10. Id.
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charges and notified Discreet that she considered the suspension, as
well as other activities of the record company, to be a material breach
of the agreement, and she indicated that if Discreet failed to cure such
breaches within the time period specified in the agreement, she would
terminate the agreement. Discreet did not cure, and on June 28, 1974,
Ms. Dalton terminated the agreement by written notice to Discreet. On
September 3, 1974, the record company corresponded with Ms. Dalton,
seeking to make recording arrangements, and Ms. Dalton responded
that the offer came too late, since the contract had been terminated in
June.
Shortly thereafter, Discreet notified Ms. Dalton that it was exercis-
ing its option to increase her compensation to at least $6,000 per year,
and a couple of weeks later sent out letters to record companies inform-
ing them that Ms. Dalton was signed to an exclusive long-term record-
ing agreement with Discreet and that any attempt by them to interfere
with Discreet's contractual rights would be "acted upon immediately
and vigorously."
About March 1, 1975, Ms. Dalton entered into a recording agree-
ment with another record company, and Discreet sought an injunction
to restrain her performance thereunder. The court denied relief on the
grounds of insufficient compliance with the statute; and subsequently,
Ms. Dalton filed a cross-complaint seeking both actual and punitive
damages, among other remedies, arising out of Discreet's interference
with Ms. Dalton's efforts to seek a new recording agreement. After
trial, the jury dismissed Discreet's complaint, and awarded Ms. Dalton
over $68,000 in damages, $12,000 of which were punitive.
The $6,000 option clause is still being used by a few record compa-
nies in a modified form, providing that the option must be exercised
prior to any breach or threatened breach by the artist. Although this
variation appears to be less at odds with the legislative intent of Civil
Code Section 3423 (Fifth) than the provision quoted above, it still risks
invalidation by the courts on several of the grounds left open by Dis-
creet, including absence of a guarantee for the entire duration of the
agreement. However, Discreet certainly was a victory for recording art-
ists in that it has served as a warning to record companies that the type
of notice used by Discreet to "discourage" other record companies
from contracting with a recording artist engaged in a dispute with the
artist's current employer could subject the record company sending
such notice to punitive as well as actual damages.
[Vol. 3
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III. MCA RECORDS, INC. v. NEWTON-JOHN:" THE OTHER SIDE OF
THE $6,000 COIN
Many disgruntled artists have invoked Civil Code Section 3423
(Fifth) in an effort to terminate recording agreements in situations
where the artists have become dissatisfied with their relationships with
the record companies or hungry for contractual freedom and the prom-
ise of more attractive terms that such freedom holds. Perhaps the most
famous of these cases, due in part to the popularity of the artist in-
volved, is the case of MCA Records, Inc. v. Newton-John. 12
In 1975, Ms. Newton-John entered into an exclusive recording
agreement with MCA for an initial period of two years, giving MCA
three options, each to renew the agreement for a period of one addi-
tional year. During each year, Ms. Newton-John was obligated to rec-
ord for and deliver to MCA, in accordance with a delivery schedule, a
sufficient number of masters to constitute two long-playing record al-
bums. MCA, in turn, was obligated to pay Ms. Newton-John royalties
based on record sales, as well as specified non-returnable advances
against royalties upon delivery of the masters for each album as fol-
lows: $221,500 for each album in the initial term, and $100,000 for
each album in each option period. MCA could reject only those mas-
ters that were technically unsatisfactory for use in manufacturing
records, and was obligated to release for sale in the United States and
Canada albums manufactured from the masters delivered to it. Ms.
Newton-John was responsible for all costs incurred in producing the
masters.
Ms. Newton-John had delivered the masters for the first four al-
bums due under the agreement and MCA had released each of those
albums and made the payments due her in connection therewith. Pro-
duction costs for the third and fourth albums were approximately
$58,000 and $132,000 respectively. The fifth album was not delivered
according to schedule (no later than October 12, 1977); and on Febru-
ary 10, 1978, MCA gave Ms. Newton-John notice of its election pursu-
ant to the agreement to extend the term of the agreement for a period
equivalent to all or any part of the period that Ms. Newton-John re-
mained in default. In March 1978, while Ms. Newton-John remained
in default, MCA paid her approximately $590,000 for royalties from
record sales. On May 23, 1978, Ms. Newton-John notified MCA of her
intent to enter into an agreement with another record company, and
11. Supra note 8.
12. Id.
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about one week later MCA filed an action for injunctive relief A pre-
liminary injunction was issued to restrain Ms. Newton-John from re-
cording for a company other than MCA pending a trial on the merits,
and Ms. Newton-John appealed.
The issues raised by this case are interesting ones: What is the
nature of the "compensation" required by the statute to be guaranteed
to the artist? Is it sufficient that the artist be guaranteed at least $6,000,
when the contract by its own terms requires that an unspecified amount
of the sums guaranteed as compensation be expended in performing
the services to be rendered? If the statute does refer to net profits, how
are such profits computed?
In her case, Ms. Newton-John was to be advanced approximately
$200,000 against royalties during the contract year, and was required to
deliver masters sufficient to constitute two albums. It was Ms. Newton-
John's contention that her obligation to assume the responsibility for
the costs incurred in connection with the production of the masters
should have been taken into account in determining whether the agree-
ment provided for the requisite minimum compensation. She alleged
that she would spend in excess of $194,000 to produce the masters, cit-
ing production costs of $132,000 on the fourth album delivered under
the agreement.
MCA argued that the requirement of Civil Code Section 3423
(Fifth) was satisfied by her guaranteed receipt of $200,000, and that to
take production costs into account would confuse the requirement of
"compensation" with "net profits," broadening the scope of the inquiry
mandated by the statute to such an extent that the determination would
be practically impossible. MCA argued further than even if Ms.
Newton-John's obligation to assume the responsibility for production
costs could be taken into account, the $6,000 requirement was met since
it was possible for her to fulfill her contractual obligation to produce
the required number of masters for less than $194,000 and therefore net
at least $6,000, citing expert testimony that masters for two albums for
an artist of Ms. Newton-John's stature could be produced for less than
$150,000. Although the decision in Foxx clearly indicated that the is-
sue was what compensation the employer was contractually obligated
to pay, not whether the employee actually received at least $6,000,
MCA noted that Ms. Newton-John was guaranteed $1,000,000 over
two years for performing her contractual obligations as a recording art-
ist, having in fact received iompensation in excess of $2,500,000 over
[Vol. 3
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the first three years of the agreement.' 3
The trial court agreed with both arguments advanced by MCA,
finding that the "minimum compensation" referred to in Section 3423
(Fifth) did not mean "net profits," and even if it did, Ms. Newton-John
had been granted an amount sufficient to enable her to make satisfac-
tory recordings and still net minimum compensation of $6,000 a year.
The appellate court sustained this ruling, noting:
It is decisive here that under the terms of the agreement
exclusive control of production costs remained in defendant's
hands at all times. Defendant was free to record in as tight-
fisted or as open-handed a manner, costwise, as she chose.
Defendant's interpretation of the minimum compensation
statutes would allow her to nullify her contract at any time
merely by increasing her production expenses, which at all
times remained under her exclusive control. We do not be-
lieve the legislature intended to sanction such a one-sided
bargain, and we agree with the trial court's ruling in both
aspects 14
The ruling of the Court of Appeal is significant. It suggests that if an
artist is guaranteed only $6,000 per year and is contractually obligated
to deliver, and bear the production costs of two albums per year, the
record company could still get an injunction. Although this result ap-
pears to be contrary to the public policy rationale of the statute, the
language of the decision clearly gives record companies broad latitude
and possibly a new way to circumvent the effect of Foxx v. Williams.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Discreet Records, Inc. v. Dalton and MCA Records, Inc. v.
Newton-John have resolved some of the issues left open in Foxx v. Wil-
liams, the two cases probably raise more questions than they answered.
Only time will be able to answer the many questions that remain. ..
subject, of course, to raising more!
13. Respondent's Brief, MCA Records v. Newton-John, supra note 8, at 35.
14. Supra note 8 at 22.
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